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Surru.nary finddings
The alarrning increase in tie  number of antidunmping  other implications, such a methodology is unlikely to be
actions pursued by both industrial and developing  accepted soon.
countries has caused considerable concern among  Although the most recent Uruguay Round
economists, tawvers, and trade reformers. These  antidumping agreement (URAA)  has enhanced the
concerns have led to suggestions to substiture antitrust  discipline and made a number of improvements, it
principles for antidcumping  laws and regulations or to use  cannot claim to have plugged all loopholes for the misuse
safeguard measures under Article XIX of GATT 1994  of antidumping. In those matters on which the
and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards.  agreement is silent or ambiguous or allows room for
Kris,hna  contends that, under current international  flexibility in adopting a rtile, national authorities should
trade law, nei,her proposal appears teasible.  Moreover,  adopt a less restrictive rule or practice.
antidumping actions lhave  become a fact of life and the  A case in poinlt is the U.S. practice on voting in the
international community recognizes them as the only  International  Trade Commission. A 3-3 vote in
legitimate tool to combat dumping as defined by ancd  antidumping and countervailing duty investigations
determined in accordance with law.  constitutes an affirmative decision. It would be
Despite urgings in s;ome  quarters, neither national legal  preferable to require a clear majority rather than treat an
systems nor international agreements have mandated an  evenly divided vote as sufficient to establish a finding of
economy-wide cost-benefit analysis of proposed  Injury.
antidumping actions. Because of political, technical, and
This paper is a product of the Legal Reform and Advisory Services Division, Legal Department.  Copies of the paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NM7,  Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Ana Maria Bobbio, room
D6-053, telephon-  2"2-458-1518,  fax 202-522-1573,  internet address abobbio@worldbank.org.  September 1997.  (37
pages)
F  The  Policv Research  'Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
Idevelopment  issues.  An object-ve  of the  smries  is toget the  findings  out quickly,  even  if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the  authors  and should  be cited accordingly.  7he findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of tJe authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
couni,,es  they rep)resent.
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- I  -SOME ASPECTS OF ANTIDUMPING
IN LAW AND PRACTICE
By Raj Krishna"
I.  INTRODUCTION
In recent years antidumping  (hereinafter sometimes "AD") has been catapulted
to  the  forefront  of  the  most  controversial  practices  in  international  trade.  While
politicians  scarcely hide their support  for antidumping, there is little love lost between
it  and  economists  as well as trade  reformers.  Interestingly  in  World  Bank's  trade
policy  loans  or  loans  in  which  trade  policy  reforms  are  a  significant  element,
antidumping  has generally not  been a major issue either  within  the Bank or  between
the Bank and the borrowing  Government.  In most cases antidumping  has been dealt
with  according  to  the  exigencies of the  situation.1 In  view  of the  importance  of
antidumping, to  international  trade  and the  fact that  States do  not  appear to  be too
eager to  renounce  it  in  the  near  future,  this  paper  discusses some  significant issues
involved  and  the  changes introduced  by the  Uruguay  Round  of trade  negotiations,
with  the hope that  such discussion will be useful to  policy and decision-makers in the
international  trade arena.
The  last fifteen  years  have witnessed  a phenomenal  growth  in  the  literature
relating  to  dumping  in  international  trade.  The politicians,  economists  and  lawyers
have all participated  in the ongoing debate on dumping with  a zeal that  is somewhat
unprecedented  even in  respect of a trade issue.  To  a considerable extent the intensity
of the debate is the direct  outcome  of the proliferation  of antidumping  laws and the
increase in the  incidence of the antidumping  actions in the principal  practitioners  of
this art among the developed countries and some developing countries who  seem well
set to  catch  up  with  the  former.  Although  both  Canada  and  U.S. have emerged  as
Former  Legal  Advisor,  International  Trade,  World  Bank. The  views  expressed  herein  are those of the
author and should  not be attributed  to the World  Bank  or its affiliates.
I  In a  Trade Policy Loan to Venezuela (Loan No. 3092 VE), the enactment of antidumping  and
countervailing  duty (hereinafter  "CVD") legislation  was specified  as a condition for the release of the
second tranche of the Loan see, Paragraph  3(b) of Schedule I  and Paragraph  4 of Schedule 4, Loan
Agreement (Trade Policy Loan) between Republic of  Venezuela and  the  International Bank  for
Reconstruction  and Development,  dated October  16, 1989;  for a Loan  to Morocco  (Loan No. 3463 MOR),
the preparation  for the regulations  for implementation  of the antidumping  legislation  was a condition  for
the presentation  of the Loan  to the Executive  Directors  of the Bank. Loan Agreement  (Second  Structural
Adjustment Loan) between Kingdom of  Morocco and  International Bank for  Reconstruction and
Development,  dated  April 30, 1992. The Bank  staff  has played a useful  role by offering  technical  and legal
comments on proposed antidumping  legislation  of, among others, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Colombia,
Senegal  and Venezuela.- 2 -
major users of antidumping  and countervailing  against  each other as well as against
other countries  including  developing  countries 2 and the U.S.  is regarded  as  the "world's
leading  prosecutor of unfair trade", Brazil,  Korea and Mexico  "have been rapidly
attempting to  turn  the  tables." 3 According to  the  U.S. International Trade
Commission  (USITC)  from 1980  through 1993,  682  antidumping  and 358 CVD cases
were filed in the United States. Of these, 39.4%  of the antidumping  and 21.2%  of
CVD  cases  resulted  in affirmative  final  determinations  and remedies  .
Antidumping  and CVD  investigations  dramatically  increased  during  the 1980s.
Boltuck and  Litan  show that  between 1980-89,  the  number of  antidumping
investigations  in the U.S.  alone  reached  451  and that of (CVD)  to 3015  and that while
2  The  formation  of  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Area  may  have  reduced  but  not  eliminated
antidumping and  countervailing  duty (hereinafter "CVD")  actions between the  parties.  As  recently as
April  1996, Canada made a final determination of dumping against certain bacteriological culture media
exported  from the  U.S. See,  13 International Trade  Reporter (I.T.R.)  727 (1996).  On the  other hand,
dumping investigations against laminated hardwood flooring from Canada are continuing in the U.S. Id. at
689.  As far as Mexico is concerned, it recently took a decision to continue antidumping duty (hereinafter
"ADD")  first imposed in December 1991 against a U.S. exporter of concrete reinforcing bar.  Canada has
recently protested the imposition of ADD by Mexico on hot rolled steel exports from Canada to Mexico.
The U.S. recently  commenced  antidumping investigations against fresh tomatoes  from  Mexico.  These
examples  can  be  multiplied.  As  regards  developing  countries,  between  1980-85,  about  12%  of
Argentinean  exports  to U.S. and  7.5% of  those of Korea  were under  countervailing duties.  See Nam,
Chong-Hyun, "Export-Promoting Subsidies, Countervailing Threats, and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade," World Bank Eco. Rev. 727 at 736 (1986).  Between 1980 and 1990, 28  antidumping actions
were filed against Korean imports in the U.S.; of the cases resolved, 73% resulted in the affirmative  and
27%  in the  negative determinations.  Krupp, Comine M., "A  Shot Across the Bow: South Korea's  First
Test of it's Antidumping Law", 26 Journal of World Trade (J.W.T.), 111 at 114, note, (1992).
3  Boltuck, Richard and Robert E. Litan, "America's  'Unfair'  Trade Laws" in Boltuck and Litan, Down in
the Dumps, Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws, at 5 (Washington, D.C. 1991).
The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements,
USITC Publication 2900, June 1995, (hereinafter "Economic Effects") at 3-1.
Numbers of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty - Investigations in the U.S., 1980-89
Year  AD  CVD
1980  37  69
1981  15  17
1982  65  116
1983  46  8
1984  74  26
1985  63  31
1986  71  20
1987  15  3
1988  42  8
1989  23  3
TOTAL,  451  301
1980-89
Boltuck and Litan supra note 3, at 2.  It may also be noted that in certain years, of all the CVD actions,
those in Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand and U.S. accounted for 75% of all CVD initiatives, 76% of
all  provisional  CVD, 92%  of  all  definitive  CVDs.  See  Rugman,  Alan  M.  and  Samuel  D.  Porteous,
"Canadian and U.S. Unfair Trade Laws:  A Comparison of their Legal and Administrative Structures,"  15
N. Carolina J. Int'l L. 67 at 82-83 (1990).- 3 -
the majority of investigations  related to steel and lumber products even products of
everyday use have not escaped  such investigations. 6 The table below shows that 1789
AD  investigations were launched between 1980-89  in  the U.S., EU,  Australia and
Canada. 7 The number is much larger if investigations  under various modalities of
safeguard  actions are taken into account.
6  Target Industries of U.S. AD and CVD Investigations, 1980-89
Industry  AD  CVD
Chemicals  58  37
Food  16  45
Iron and Steel  201  149
Leather  ...  6
Machinery  8  6
Nonferrous metals  16  5
Oil country tubular goods  12  8
Textiles and apparel  15  6
Lumber  ...  4
Other  125  34
All products  451  300
7  See  Messerlin,  Patrick A.,  "Antidumping" in  Schott, Jeffrey J.  (Editor), Completing  the  Uruguay
Round:  A Results-Oriented  Approach  to the  GATT Trade  Negotiations  at  110-11 (Washington,  D.C.
1990).- 4 -
Number of Actions
Investigation  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  All
Years
United  States
Anti-  24  15  63  47  73  65  70  14  40  411
dumping
CVD  11  22  145  22  52  38  26  5  3  332
GA  7T  2  2
Safeguard
Escape  2  6  1  5  6  3  3  2  2  30
clause
Other  10  7  7  2  1  3  4  5  39
European  Union
Anti-  26  47  55  43  42  35  31  34  40  353
dumping
CVD  1  4  3  1  2  11
GA  TT  1  1  1  2  1  6
Safeguard
Escape  2  5  1  8  4  11  31
Clause
Other  2  2
Australia
Anti-  58  49  77  80  56  63  62  17  16  478
dumping
CVD  3  7  6  3  3  22
GA  7T  1  1
Safeguard
Canada
Anti-  25  23  72  36  31  36  85  86  53  447
dumping
CVD  3  1  3  2  2  4  6  2  23
GA Tl  1  1  2
Safeguard
Developing  Countries





In the last two years, however, as reported to GATT/WTO,  a downward  trend
in the  antidumping  actions taken  globally  is discernible.  During  the  period July  1,
1993 - June 30, 1994 the total number  of antidumping  investigations reached 222, two
less than  the previous  corresponding  period.  The initiation  of actions reported  was:
EU  (47), U.S. (47), Australia  (45), Brazil (30), Mexico (23), Canada  (22), New Zealand
(2), India (1), Japan  (1) and Korea (4).  During  the period July  1, 1994-June 30, 1995,
the  total  number  of  antidumping  investigations  declined  further.  Of  the  142
investigations initiated  during this period,  Argentina reported  (6), Australia  (6), Brazil
(12), Canada  (9), Colombia  (1), EU  (37), India  (9), Korea  (3), Mexico  (18), New
Zealand  (9), Singapore  (2), and  the  U.S.  (30).  By June  1995, the  total  number  of
measures in  force was 724 of which  the U.S.  accounted for  (305), EU  (178), Canada
(91), Australia  (86) and Mexico  (42).'
With  the  increase in  its pending  investigations,  Mexico has  now  earned  the
dubious  distinction  of  having the  greatest  antidumping  caseload in  the  world.9 A
recent  entrant  into this field is India and China is likely to  follow  soon.  Along with
trade  liberalization  measures  of  the  early  90s,  India  energized  its  antidumrping
procedures which had been lying dormant  in the statute book for about a decade.1  By
January  1995,  one  final  determination  of  dumping  had  been  made  and  ADD
imposed",  one provisional antidumping  ADD imposed1 2 and six investigations were in
the pipeline.1 3 From  1993 through July  1996 about 40 complaints are said to have been
received'4. Another  new user of antidumping  is Thailand.  Two  investigations  have
been  carried  out  so far  with  one  resulting  in  the  imposition  of  antidumping  duty
against  India.  The  spread  of  antidumping  actions  to  developing  countries  was
anticipated and should not come as a shock or surprise. 5
While  the  number  of  countries  resorting  to  antidumping  weaponry  has
increased, the overall growth  rate of AD actions, as pointed  out  earlier, appears to  be
8  WTO, GATT  Activities  1994-1995,  at 77-78  (Geneva,  April 1996).
9  12 I.T.R.  at 564  (1995).
10  Antidumping  provisions  were inserted  in the Customs  Tariff Act, 1975 in 1982.  See also Customs
Tariff (Identification,  Assessment  and Collection of Anti-Dumping  Duty on Dumped Articles and for
Determination  of Injury) Rules, 1995 promulgated  after the Uruguay Round replacing the erstwhile
Customs  Tariff  (Identification,  Assessment  and Collection  of Duty or Additional  Duty on Dumped  Articles
and for Determination  of Injury Rules, 1985.  The need for antidumping  measures  was emphasized  in
Business  Times  of India, April  7, 1992.
"1  Poly Vinyl Chloride  Resin from Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  Republic  of Korea and USA. Ministry  of
Commerce  Notification,  July 30, 1993. The Gazette  of India: Extraordinary  Part  I - Sec 1.
12  Bisphenol-A  from Japan. Ministry  of Commerce  Notification,  August 10, 1993,  The Gazette  of India
Extraordinarv,  Part I - Sec.1.
I  Acrylonitrite  Butadine  Rubber from Japan; Potassium  Permanganate  from China;  Bisphenol  "A" from
Russia and Brazil;  3,4,5 - Trimethoxy  Bezaldehyde  from PR China; Theophylline  and Caffeine  from P.R.
China- and Isobutyl benzene from China.
'India  Abroad,  New York,  at 26 (July 19, 1996).
15  Thus Boltuck and Litan observed that the U.S. technology of identifuing "unfair trade"  has reached
abroad and that the U.S. will reap the consequences.  Boltuck and Litan, supra note 3, at 6.- 6 -
slowing down for the principal users. This may very well be the result of the enhanced
discipline  introduced by the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations' 6
Antidumping actions have often proved to be dilatory and cumbersome.  At
times more than 25 companies have been subject to investigations. 17 The filing of 72
trade cases  against  20 countries by the U.S. steel producers in 1992  and the subsequent
imposition of preliminary ADD and CVD  'provoked  outrage in  the  world steel
community."' 8 The U.S. Department of Commerce ruled that steel products from 19
countries were being dumped in the U.S." 9
II.  DUMPING:  WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT OCCURS
Dumping is defined variously in the literature on the subject.  Central to  all
these definitions,  however, is the concept of price discrimination in different markets.
Thus, in 1922,  Jacob Viner defined  dumping as "price discrimination between national
markets." 20 In international trade dumping is said to occur when the sale of products
for export is at "prices lower than those charged to  domestic buyers, taking into
account the conditions and terms of sale." 2 1 According to  other writers:  "Loosely
defined, dumping occurs  when similar products are sold by a firm in an export market
for less than what is charged in the home market.  Alternatively it may occur if the
export price  of the  product  is less than  total  average costs or  marginal costs." 22
According to Article VI, GATT 1994,  a product is said to be dumped when its export
price is less than its normal value, that is, less than the sale of a like product in the
domestic market. The concept appears  to be simple enough. But the determination of
the  export  and the  home-market prices and their  comparison have proven to  be
anything but simple in State practice.
Economists have debated whether, and if so, under what circumstances  does
dumping take place. Jacob Viner identifies  three types of dumping situations: sporadic
16  Thus  in January  1995, the number of pending  AD and CVD actions  in the U.S. stood at 19 and 4,
respectively,  12 I.T.R. 191-193 (1995) and in January  1996, at 9 and 1, respectively,  see  13 I.T.R. 178-179
(1996).  By April 1996, the number  of pending  actions  did show an increase.  Id. at 690-691.
17  Certain  Antifriction  Bearings  54  Fed.  Reg.  at 20900-12 (1989).
18  Oxford  Analytica,  June  17, 1993.
19  See 10 I.T.R.at  1014  (1993).
20  Viner,  Jacob,  Dumping: A Problem  in International  Trade, at 3 (Chicago,  1923).
21  Slayton,  P., "The Canadian  Legal Response  to Steel  Dumping" Canada  U.S. Law Jn'l 1979 quoted in
Lazar, F., "Antidumping  Rules following  Canada  - United States Free Trade Agreement." 23 J.W.T.  45
(1989).
22  Hoekman, Bernard  M. and Michael P. Leidy, "Dumping, Antidumping and Emergency Protection", 23
J.W.T. 27 (1989, No. 5).  James Devault says:  "The phenomenon of dumping takes place when a firm sells
a product abroad  at a  price which is beneath its fair value."  See Devault,  "The Administration of US
Antidumping  Duties:  Same  Empirical Observations."  13 World Economy,  75,  (1990).  For a  rather
elusive definition,  see Finger, J. Michael, Editor, Antidumping How It Works and Who Gets Hurt, (Ann
Arbor,  University of Michigan  Press, 1993), wherein the following definition is given:  "The pragmatic
definition of  dumping is the following:  dumping is whatever you can get the government to act against
under the antidumping law." at viii.- 7 -
dumping,  short-run  or intermittent  dumping  and long-term  or continuous  dumping.
In the case  of sporadic  dumping  the motivation  is to dispose  of  goods  for a short-run  to
get rid of surplus  shock. Short-run or intermittent  dumping  is not continuous  and is
motivated  by entering  into a new market,  retaining  the market  share  or driving  away
the competitors  from the market. Long-term  or continuous  dumping  is motivated  by
the intent to reach  or maintain  full production  in large  scale  economies. Sporadic
dumping  is likely  to result  only in damage  to the exporting  or the importing  country.
Short-run dumping also does not necessarily  hurt. 23
Viner  argued  that AD authority  may be needed  to protect  domestic  consumers
against  predatory  dumping. In predatory  pricing  a foreign  firm or cartel  attempts  to
drive away  the domestic  competitors  then establishes  a monopoly  and subsequently
increases the price. 24 "Predatory  Pricing", thus,  "refers to  the  use of short-run  price
cutting  in an effort to exclude rivals on a basis other than efficiency in order to  gain or
protect  market  power.  . . . Predatory  pricing,  however,  is  a  complex  form  of
anticompetitive  conduct.  It  requires the perpetrator  to  incur  substantial  losses or  at
least to  forego present profits  in the hope that those losses can be more than  recouped
in the  future through  the exercise of market  power.  Thus, market  conditions  play a
key  role  in  determining  whether  price  predation  is a  feasible tactic  for  a  firm  to
employ.  The predator  must have a very substantial share of the market  or at least the
capacity to acquire such a share."  25
However,  economists  are  not  in  full  agreement  as  to  the  occurrence  of
predatory  dumping.  It is maintained  that it is inconceivable for a firm to suffer losses
over a long period of time  and that  as for predatory  dumping a firm must  establish a
global  monopoly,  that  too  is  difficult to  conceive will  happen  in  most  industries.
Hoekman  and  Leidy point  out that  even laboratory  experimental  work  by  Isac and
Smith has failed to produce any evidence of predatory pricing. 26
On the other hand it is maintained by others that instances of predatory  pricing
are there although they are rare.  Thus the OECD  Report mentioned  above concludes:
"Perhaps all that can be said is that cases of predation  may arise but at most only very
rarely." 27 Much in the same vein, Hindley observes that examples of predatory  pricing
are few, "they are not zero."  According to him, recent analysis that suggests predatory
pricing will "never" occur is too  strong.  He goes on to  say:  "The  law and economics
23  Beirwagen,  Rainer  M. and  Kay  Hailbronner,  "Input,  Downstream,  Upstream,  Secondary,  Diversionary
and Components  or Subassembly  Dumping", 22  J.W.T. 27 at 32  note 27,  (No. 3  1988).  See also,
Schoenbaum,  Thomas J., "Antidumping  and Countervailing Duties  and the GATT:  An  Evaluation and
Proposal for a Unified Remedy for Unfair International Trade", 30 German Y.B.I.L. 177 at 179 (1987).
24  Viner attributes the  enactment of the first antidumping provision in the U.S. in 1916 to the dumping
threat posed by the highly cartelized  and heavily protected German industries.  See Staiger, Robert W. and
Frank A. Wolak, The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly, NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 3254 at I (February 1990).
25  OECD, Predatory Pricing, at 81 (Paris, 1989).
26  See Isaac,  R. Mark and Vernon  L. Smith,  "In Search  of Predatory  Pricing"  93 J. Pol. Eco. 320 (1985)
referred to in Hoekman and Leidy, supra note 22, at 32.
27  OECD, supra note 25, at 81.- 8 -
of predatory  pricing,  in fact,  is something  of a swamp. Fortunately,  it is not necessary
to enter that swamp  to discuss  contemporary  antidumping  policy. The simple  fact is
that the great bulk of actual  antidumping  cases  cannot conceivably  be explained  in
terms of predatory  pricing." 28
In order for the dumping  to take  place,  it is maintained  that:  (i) markets  must
be segmented  so that exporters'  home market is sealed  against  secondary  sales,  (ii)
exporting  firm acquires  sufficient  market  power in at least  one market to enable  it to
influence  the price, and (iii)  export market demand  is more elastic  than in the home
market,  i.e. the sales  are responsive  to lower  price. 29 A question  then arises  whether
such  segmentation  is possible  in international  market. In this connection  it is pointed
out:
"However,  in practice,  market  segmentation  will usually  be the
primary  necessary  condition  for price  dumping  to occur. The question
then arises: is international  market  segmentation  common? For many
products and industries  the answer is yes.  Product differentiation,
variation in  tastes, trade policies and regulatory regimes, differing
product  standards,  etc.,  all work to segment  markets. The result is that
the trading environment will often be quite conducive  to  acts of
intentional  and  unintentional  price  dumping." 30
To some  who doubt that dumping  at all takes  place,  the following  remarks  of
the authors  may be drawn  to their attention:
"The dual definition  of dumping  (i.e. price dumping  and cost
dumping),  the possibility  of deliberate  and unintentional  dumping,  and
the relatively  weak conditions  necessary  to produce an environment
hospitable  to both types of dumping,  all suggest  that its occurrence  as
defined  by law  will be frequent."3
III.  IS DUMPING  HARMFUL?
There is no hard and fast answer  from economists  to the question  whether
dumping  is detrimental. 32 It is quite obvious,  though,  that the consumers  of dumped
product gain  while  the producers  of the like product  may suffer  a loss. Antidumping
is, therefore,  viewed as having no economic justification.  Hindley  says:
28  Hindley,  Brian,  "The  Economics  of Dumping  and  Anti-Dumping  Action:  Is there  a baby  in the bath
water?"  in Tharakan,  P.K.M., Ed.,  Policy Implications  of Antidumping  Measures,  25  at 29  (Elsevier
Science  Publishers  B.V.,  Amsterdam  1991).
29  Hoekman  and  Leidy,  supra  note  22,  at 30-31.
30  Id. at 31
3t  Id. at 32.
Beirwagen and Hailbronner, supra  note 23, at 33.-9-
"The  problem  for antidumping  policy  is to explain  why the mere
fact  that the dumping  firm charges  a higher  price  in its home market is
sufficient  to provide competing  domestic  firms (or their government)
with a right to take action  against  the dumping  -with a right to require
or compel  such  a higher  price  in their own market." 33
Some economists  have argued that before the national authorities impose
antidumpinp  duty,  a study  of  the entire  economy-wide  effects  of such  imposition  must
be studied.  Studies of this nature are nonexistent.  The Economic Effects,
mentioned  earlier,  is only an ex post facto analysis  carried  out by USITC  of "the
economy-wide  effects  of a simultaneous  removal  of outstanding  AD/CVD orders in
1991". According  to this analysis  the removal  results  in a welfare  gain to the U.S.
economy  of $1.9  billion. Had the effect  of approximately  another 110  orders  since
1991  been  taken  into account  the net gain  to the economy  likely  would  have  been  'far
greater".35
As against  the views  which  deny  examples  of cases  in which  antidumping  action
is economically  justified,  one could  refer  to what the U.S.  Assistant  Attorney-General
Samuel  Graham  stated  in 1916.  He observed:
".. . generally  accepted  principles  of political  economy  hold  that
it is not sound policy for any Government  to permit the sale in its
country by foreign  citizens  of material  at a price below the cost of
production  at the place  produced,  for the reason  that such  a system,  in
its final  analysis  and on a sufficient  scale,  spells  bankruptcy." 36
Even if  bankruptcy is viewed as  a  rather far-fetched  consequence,  it  is
recognized  that for an importing country short-term  benefit to consumers  buying
dumped  products  may  conflict  with the long-term  national  economic  interests. 37
Dumping  is considered  to provide  an unfair  trade  advantage  to the exporter  and
therefore  contrary to the cannons  of free trade.  A recent writer has observed  that
many  statesmen,  scholars  and trade  specialists  recognize  that free  trade  and fair  trade go
hand in hand.  3  Some  writers,  however,  regard  the legalism  of distinguishing  between
33  Hindley, supra note 28, at 30.
34  This aspect is discussed later in this paper.  See pp. 13-15 infra.
35  See supra note 4, at x-xi, III.
36  Quoted in Stewart, Terence P., Editor, The GATT Uruguay Round, A Negotiating History (1986-1992),
Vol. II at 1390 (Kluwer, Deventer, 1993).
37  See Eckes, Alfred E., "The Interface of Antitrust and Trade Laws - Conflict or  Harmony?  An  ITC
Commissioner's Perspective," 56 Antitrust L.J. 417 (1987).
38  See Piontek,  Eugeniusz,  "Anti-Dumping  in the EEC - Some  Observations  by an Outsider," 21 J.W.T.L.
67 at 68 (August 1987). The concern  with "fair" trade was expressed  by President  Reagan  in these  words:
"To make the international  trading system  work, all must abide by the rules - all must work  to guarantee
open markets.  Above all else, free trade is, by definition, fair trade.  When domestic markets are closed to
the exports of others, it is no longer free trade.  When governments  subsidize  their manufacturers  and
farmers  so that they can dump  goods in other  markets,  it is no longer  free  trade. When governments  permit- 10  -
unfair  and fair trade  as by itself a non-tariff  barrier;  while some others  do not  regard
such distinction as important.  A typical observation may be noted:
"There  is nothing  self-evidently fair about  the  displacement  of
domestic  miners  as an  outcome  of the  discovery  abroad  of  cheaply-
mined  coal, or in  a competition  between domestic textile  workers  and
unsubsidized foreign workers earning a fraction of the domestic
trade  . . . It follows  that  the  adoption  of a special  course  of action  to  deal
with  unfair  competition  is  likely  to  weaken  the  foundations  upon
which policies with  respect to fair competition  are based." 39
To some the right to  retaliate against dumping is not founded in unfairness but
in the excessive cost of market  disruption  as much by "unfair" trade as by "fair" trade.
Thus, why imports  are cheap is irrelevant. 40 It has also been suggested that  instead of
drawing the distinction  of "fair" and "unfair" trade, one should focus on "acceptable vs.
unacceptable  levels  of  trade  or  market  share  or  import  penetration,  however,  the
concept is formulated.  So long as we are not willing to legislate world-wide uniformity
in  wage  scales,  exchange  rates,  environmental  controls,  debt/equity  ratios,
depreciation,  interest  rates,  and  accounting  techniques,  and  indeed  comparable
relations  between 3overnment  and industry,  what is fair and what  is unfair is in large
part coincidence." 4
Be this  as it may, it is correct to  say that by and large AD  measures have gone
beyond  creating  a  level  playing  field  and  have  been  used  to  protect  declining
industries. 42 Dale concludes that  "[a]ntidumping  laws are at best  superfluous  and  at
worst a serious impediment  to  commerce." 43 These strong views stem from criticisms
both  of the theoretical bases of antidumping policies and the implementation  of those
Continued
counterfeiting  or copying of American  products,  it is stealing our future, and it is no longer free trade...
When  governments  assist  their exporters  in  ways that  violate  international  laws,  then the playing  field is no
longer level - and there is no longer free trade.  When governments  subsidize  industries  for commercial
advantage  and underwrite  costs,  placing an unfair  burden  on competitors,  that is not free trade. . . I believe
that if trade is not fair for all, then trade is 'free' in name only."  Quoted in Snape, Richard  H., "The
Importance  of  Frontier  Barriers"  in  Kierzkowski,  Henryk,  Editor,  Protection  and  Competition  in
International  Trade: Essays  in Honor  of W.M.  Corden  215  at 228-29  (London,  1987).
Hindley,  Brian,  "Subsidies,  Politics  and  Economics" in Wallace,  Don,  Frank  J. Loftus  and Van Z.
Krikorian,  Editors,  Interface  Three: Legal  Treatment  of Domestic  Subsidies  29 at 30-31  (Washington  D.C.
at 1984),  hereinafter  referred  to as "Wallace".
40  Barcel6 III, John J., "Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round."  13
Cornell Int'l  L.J. 257 at 260 (1980).  See also same writer, "An 'Injury-Only'  Regime (For Imports) and
Actionable Subsidies" in Wallace, supra note 39, at 19.
41  Lowenfeld,  Andreas  F., "Fair or Unfair  Trade:  Does  It Matter" 13  Cornell  Int'l L.J.  205 at 219 (1980).
42  Wilkinson, Bruce W., "The Saskatchewan Potash Industry and the 1987 U.S. Antidumping Action", 15
Can. Pub. Policy 145 (1989).
43  Dale, R., Anti-dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order (Macmillan, London), 1980 quoted in Yarrow,
George "Economic Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policies," 3 Oxf. Rev. of Ec. Pol. 66 at 66-67 (1987).- 11  -
policies.44 Antidumping  laws,  it  is  maintained,  are  biased  in  favor  of  finding  of
dumping. 45
Finding  little  or, at best,  dubious justification  for antidumping,  some writers
have suggested other  alternatives as well as more rigorous  methodological  and  other
changes.  The  more  significant ones  are discussed below  under  "Major  Proposals".
Some changes proposed  from  time  to time  as regards specific aspects of antidumping
laws and practices did find acceptance at the Uruguay Round  and the same are noted in
the discussion relating to URAA. 46
IV.  MAJOR PROPOSALS
(a)  Replace antidumping with antitrust  principles 47
The  replacement  of  AD  laws  by  antitrust  principles  has  been  proposed
particularly  in the context  of NAFTA.  The  official U.S. view, however,  is that  the
AD  and CVD laws "are likely to remain as 'basic components'  of American trade law
for some time  because of the intermediating function they play between different styles
of market  economies.  The U.S. antidumping  and countervailing  duty laws will not  be
on the table in the foreseeable future." 48 It should be noted that not only the antitrust
and  AD  laws,  as  for  example  in  the  U.S.,  have  fundamentally  different  policy
objectives,  they  also  have major  substantive  and  procedural  differences. With  such
differences, it is felt, that  "it remains likely, if not  inevitable, that  the application  and
enforcement  of  the  antidumping  law  and  the  antitrust  laws  will  continue  to  be
generally inconsistent and often in conflict with  one another." 49
44  Id.
See, generally, Jackson, John H. and Edwin A.  Vermulst, Antidumping  Law and Practice, A
Comparative  Study (University  of Michigan  Press, Ann Arbor), 1989. For a critical  evaluation  of U.S.
antidumping  practice,  see Schoenbaum,  supra note 23, at 177  et seq.  A Japanese  report alleged  that the
U.S. was moving  towards  an "illegitimate  mechanism  operating  outside  the intemational  rules." Financial
Times,  July 17, 1991,  at 8.
As regards  EU Norall  points  out: "In a word, if certain  facts  are present,  various  aspects  of the technical
methodology  now applied  by the Commission  in anti-dumping  cases  tends to make findings  of dumping  at
significant levels automatic  and inevitable.  . ."  See Norall, "New Trends in Anti-dumping  Practice in
Brussels",  9 World Economy  97, at 98 (1986). A small  minority  of writers  feels  that U.S. law is not being
administered  in a "blatantly"  protectionist  manner  nor does such law has a protectionist  bias. On this, see
Devault,  supra  note 22, at 75 et seq.
46  Agreement  on Implementation  of Article  VI of the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade 1994. For
the text of URAA see, Office of the United States Trade  Representative,  Uruguay  Round, Final Texts of
the  GATT Uruguay Round Agreements Including The Agreement Establishing the  World Trade
Organization,  As Signed  on April 15, 1994,  Marrakech,  Morocco  (Washington  D.C.)  at 145-169.
"  See comments  of Calvin  Goldman  of Davies  Ward  & Beck  of Toronto, 13  I.T.R.  255 (1996).
4S  12 I.T.R. 1393  (1995).
49  Applebaum,  Harvey M. and David R. Grace, "U.S. Antitrust  Law and Antidumping  Actions Under
Title  VII of the Trade  Agreements  Act by 1979,"  56 Antitrust  Law  Jn'l, 497 at 518  (1987).- 12 -
Another  related suggestion is that antitrust  authorities should participate in AD
cases with  the power  to  veto actions deemed  likely to  be harmful  to  competition.50
Given  the  differences between  the thrust  and the  objectives of the  AD  and  antitrust
laws, it is doubtful  if such a veto power can be given to  antitrust  officials.  It may be
noted that in the 1970s  the antitrust division of the Justice Department  of the U.S. used
to  participate  in  the  AD  proceedings  but  the  practice  was later  discontinued  as it
proved quite unsuccessful.
(b)  Use safeguard  measures  under Article XIX GAT7T  1994 instead of AD
Prior  to  the conclusion of the Uruguay Round  certain writers  made proposals
in this  direction.51 The limitations  of space do not  permit  a full discussion of GATT
"safeguard"  clause  and  its  alleged superiority  over  antidumping  actions  or  of  the
legality  of the  recourse to  the use of such clause in the  normal  course  to  counteract
dumping.  Suffice it to  say that  Article XIX  (safeguard) and Article  VI (antidumping)
of GATT  1994, together  with  their  complementary  Uruguay  Round  agreements  are
designed for  different  situations.  The former  afford  protection  when  the  domestic
industry  suffers injury  by  a  sudden  surge in  imports  in  fair  trade  and  where  no
allegations  of wrong-doing  are made  while the  latter  provide  remedy  against unfair
trade.  There  can be circumstances where  the two  overlap as, for example, when  the
sudden  increase is  attributed  to  dumping;  in  that  case one  could  perhaps  resort  to
safeguard clause.  It  is difficult to  see how  in  most  cases the  importing  country  can
resort  to  Article  XIX  and the Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  Safeguards (URSA) to
remedy AD.
(c)  Antidumping duty should be a controlled  remedy
It  has been proposed  that  the ADD  could be decreased by a fixed proportion
per  year52 or  that  the  AD  law  cap the  amount  of  ADD  so that  the  tariff,  if  any,
together  with  the  ADD  shall  not  exceed  a  certain  amount.  Both  suggestions  are
interesting.  But any a priori  specification of a percentage by which  the ADD  should
taper  off yearly  or of a ceiling could frustrate the purpose  of ADD  which  is to  offset
the  dumping  margin.  It  will be appreciated  that  dumping  margins have often  been
determined to exceed 100%53  There is also a risk that the tapering off of or the capping
50  Hoekman and Leidy, supra note 22, at 4 1.
51  Barcel6  III advocated a single  safeguard code "as  the  sole standard for relief  against all  injurious
imports".  See Barcel6 III, "Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round",
supra note 40, at 258.  Other writers like Gary Sampson and Finger also support recourse to Article XIX
GATT 1994 rather than to Article VI.
52  Hoekman and Leidy, supra note 22, at 41.
53  See,  for  example,  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce's  (hereinafter  "Commerce")  determinations  in
Coumarin  from the  People's  Republic of China, USITC Pub. 2852, February  1995, (160.8%)  at  A-14;
Fresh Garlic from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 2825, November  1994 (376.67% BIA (i.e.
best information available) rate as alleged in the petition) at A-  11.  In a case brought by Eastman Kodak
against Fuji Photo Film Co., Commerce, in a preliminary determination, slapped margins of dumping of- 13 -
of ADD  could lead to increased dumping  or to  exports with  greater dumping  margin
inasmuch  as the exporters would  be aware of the limitations  of the importing  country
to retaliate.
(d)  Carry out "national economic interest" test or "nation-wide cost-benefit
analysis" with  respect to proposed AD action
According to the proponents  of this view, the AD  mechanism must provide an
economy-wide  assessment  of  the  effects of  the  AD  measure.  The  advisability  of
adopting this test is strongly  advocated by Hoekman  and Leidy in these words:
"Incorporation  of a national interest  clause in AD  procedures would be
a major improvement.  It would imply that before an affirmative finding
can be made, a cost/benefit  analysis should indicate that  for the nation
as a whole  protection  of an industry  is worthwhile.  A weaker version
of this idea would be to allow consumer interests to have a greater voice
in AD proceedings than is presently the case. If it were required that all
users of the products  (both final consumers,  if any, and firms using the
affected  products  as  inputs)  be  offered  a  voice,  the  likelihood  of
affirmative actions might diminish.", 54
The  central  element  of the  national  economic  interest  test is  "to  change the
focus  of the  investigation  from  the  effect  of the  proposed  restriction  on  domestic
producers  of like or competing goods to the effect on the national economic interest  of
the  restricting  country."  By national  economic  interest  is meant  "the  sum  of the
benefits to all nationals who benefit minus the costs to all nationals who lose.  Injury,
as it is defined in trade  remedy  law, is one half of the national  economic  interest  (...
usually the smaller half."" 55
To  a lawyer  such proposals  ring a familiar bell as they  are reminiscent  of the
ideas  of  the  English  utilitarians  of  the  18th  century  to  whom  the  test  of  good
legislation was "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."  As Jeremy Bentham's
Continued
321% to 360%  on the photographic paper.  See, 11 I.T.R. at  1181-82 (1994).  A margin  of as high as
595.66% was found in respect of Venezuela, see, Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from France, India,
Israel, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, United Kingdom and Venezuela  (Inv. Nos. 731-TA-688-695),  59 FR
50560 October  4,  1994.  It is interesting to note, however, that even  a high dumping margin  may  not
necessarily result in a positive injury finding.  See for such a situation, Saccharin from China and Korea
(Inv. Nos. 73 1-TA-675, 676), 11 I.T.R. at 1985 (1994).
54  See, Hoekman and Leidy, supra note 22 at 41.  See also Yarrow, supra note 43 at  77, who, while
recommending cost-benefit analysis, also recognizes that the value of such analysis could be doubted as
there is little reason to believe that the impact of dumping on welfare will generally be negative.
55  Finger, supra note 22,  at 70.  Under this approach, the "injury  investigation" will be replaced by a
national economic interest investigation which will not be "retrofitted to antidumping cases" as at present.
Id. at 71.- 14 -
hedonistic calculus 56 would involve aggregating  the pleasures  on one side and pains on
the  other so would the proposed cost-benefit  analysis for the  "nation as a whole"
which, perhaps, is easily said than done.  What factors will go into such analysis?
What weight shall be given  to pain and suffering  and lost expectations  of those affected
by  allowing an industry to  perish?  In  this regard the  observations of  a lawyer,
although a staunch defender of U.S. AD laws and practice, deserve to  be quoted.
Stewart asserts:
"The American landscape  is littered with the tombstones of companies
starved  by  inadequate returns  of  capital employed.  Many  such
tombstones have  nothing to do with artificial  advantages  used by foreign
competitors. Many -too many- are the direct result of dumping into the
U.S. market." 57
Since a cost-benefit  analysis for the  nation as a whole would not  be based
exclusively on  econometrical equations but  also  on  some objective criteria  the
possibility of legal challenges  in a court of law cannot be ruled out.  Writers proposing
this  test  unfortunately  do  not  throw  sufficient light  on  the  methodology to  be
followed. 58
It is submitted that not only would such an analysis  be itself costly and time-
consuming, it will likely be politically unacceptable  as well.  The reason is not far to
seek. When a State causes  injury to its citizen or citizens in the larger interest of the
public (e.g.  the exercise  of the power of eminent domain) it has to follow due process
of law and must compensate  those who are injured; but, the effect of what is being
advocated  is that foreign exporters, untrammeled as they are by any due process of law
constraints, can injure the citizens of a State (domestic  industry) through dumping so
long as it is in the interest of the public at large or national economy, and get away
with it, while, at the same time, as if to add insult to the injury, impose an additional
burden on the State to  do full cost-benefit  analysis to  allow for such a situation to
develop. Due to the impracticality of following such a course for each and ever  AD
action, it is hard to  imagine any country doing such analysis.  Even the EU"  and
56  Bentham  took the idea of calculating  pains and pleasures  as a measure  of utility from the Italian  penal
reformer  Beccaria  who in 1764  wrote:  "Good legislation..  .is the art of conducting  man to the maximum  of
happiness and to the minimum  of misery,  if we may apply this mathematical  expression  to the good and
evil of  life."  Quoted in Stone, Julius.  The Province and Function of Law.  Law as Logic, Justice and
Social Control.  A Study in Jurisprudence at 272 (Sydney, 1946).
"  Stewart, Terence, "Administration of the Antidumping Law: A Different Perspective," in Boltuck and
Litan, supra note 3, 288 at 292.
58  In the case of the study carried out by USITC of the economic effects of existing AD and CVD orders
and  suspension  agreements,  four  USITC Commissioners  expressed  doubts  or  reservations,  to  varying
degree, as to the methodology followed.  Economic Effects supra note 4, For the views of Commissioners
Nuzum  and  Rohr, see,  id. at VII.  Commissioner  Don Newquist  felt that the  report was essentially  an
academic  exercise  in  modeling  and  counterfactual  economic  theory,  id.  at  XI;  Commissioner  Bragg
emphatically asserted  that  although "economic modelling is a useful  tool,  it cannot substitute  for  'real
world'  experience," id. at XIII.
Thakran, P.K.M. "Some Facets of Antidumping Policy: Summary of the Contents of the Volume"  in
Thakran, Policy, Implications of Antidumping Measures, supra note 28, at 7.- 15 -
Canada 60 which earlier followed a lesser test of "public interest" have veered away
from it.  It must be noted that despite  the urgings  from economists  during the Uruguay
Round, the URAA does not provide for a "public interest" clause and does not even
include consumers, central  to any national interest inquiry, among "interested  parties"
for purposes of AD investigations. 61
V.  REMEDY AGAINST DUMPING: THE MUNICIPAL ANTIDUMPING
LAWS
Currently, more than 40 countries have enacted antidumping legislation. The
antidumping actions originated first in  Canada under an Act of  1904.62 A  novel
measure in the form of antidumping duty was invented which was designed to satisfy
manufacturers  who desired higher customs duties and farmers whose interests lay in
lower duties. 63
Canada  was followed by New Zealand (1905),  Australia (1906)  and South Africa
(1914). In the U.S., the first antidumping legislation,  the Revenue Act of 191664  was
enacted mainly out of concern for the protection of U.S. industry against  the German
cartels. From then onwards the history of antidumping is one of increased refinement
and  fine-tuning.  With  the  passage of time,  almost all the  countries mentioned,
including England,  enacted new antidumping legislation.
The Revenue  Act of 1916  of U.S. defined  dumping as follows:
"It is unlawful to import articles  into the United States  at a price
substantially  less  than the actual market value or wholesale  price of such
articles,  provided that it was done with the intent to destroy or injure a
United  States  industry  or  to  prevent  the  establishment of  such
industry."
The "intent to destroy or injure" a U.S. industry was not easy to establish. The
Antidumping Act of 1921, therefore, dropped this uncomfortable idea and instead
provided:
60  A writer  has pointed  at that "public  interest"  investigation  led to a reduction  in the level of duty in only
one case. See Dutz, Mark  A., "Enforcement  of Canadian  Trade  Remedy  Laws: The Competition  Policies
as an Antidote  for Protection."  in Finger,  supra  note 22, 203 at 215. It may also be noted that in Australia
the inclusion of a "national interest"  clause in the legislation  was rejected because it would add to the
uncertainty  of the proceedings  and administrative  complexity  and would increase  cost of investigation  to
the parties and the Govemment. See Banks, Gary, "The Antidumping  Experience  of a GATT-Fearing
Country"  in id. 183,  at 187.
61  Article  6.6.1  1.
62  See An Act  to Amend  the Customs  Tariffs  of 1897,  S.C. 1904,  C ll, S. 19.
63  Earlier AD laws differ considerably  with their recent counterparts. For example, up until 1969
Canadian  legislation  did not specify  the requirement  of injury test.  See Magnus,  Peter A, "The Canadian
Antidumping  System"  in Jackson  and Vermulst,  supra  note 45, 167  at 174.
64  Pub. L. No. 64-271,  Section  801, 39 Stat.  798.- 16 -
"A special dumping  duty  will be applied  upon  a finding that  a
U.S.  industry  is being or is likely  to  be injured,  or  is prevented  from
being established, due to  the importation  of a class or  kind  of foreign
merchandise  that  is being sold  or  is likely  to  be  sold  in  the  U.S.  or
elsewhere at less than its fair value." 65
The  U.  S. law  was  amended 66 to  reflect the  changes brought  about  by  the
Tokyo  Round Antidumping  Code. 67 The law has further  been amended in the light of
the URAA.68
VI.  ANTIDUMPING  ON  THE  INTERNATIONAL  PLANE  AND  VOICES
OF CRITICISM
Antidumping  was not  regulated under  international  law until  the adoption  of
GATT  1947, although the League of Nations  undertook  a study of dumping as early as
1922.69 Article VI of GATT  "condemned" dumping but did not outlaw it.
During  the 1950's GATT faced only one challenge to antidumping.  This was a
complaint  by  Italy  against  Sweden's  antidumping  finding  against  Italian  nylon
stockings. 70 Various  aspects  of  antidumping,  however,  continued  to  engage  the
attention  of GATT  which had its groups of experts study them. 71 It was, however,  not
until the Kennedy  Round  (1963) that the regulation of antidumping  actions was taken
up  in  earnest.  At  that  time,  considerable  concern  was  expressed  about  the  U.S.
antidumping  law and the manner of its application.
Despite some opposition  an international  code (GATT  AD  Code  of 1968) on
antidumping  procedures  was adopted72 but  opposition  thereto  intensified in the  U.S.
Congress.  The Code did, however,  lead to major revisions of AD  law of Canada and
of the EU regulations.  By the time of the Tokyo  Round  (1973), a number of issues in
65  Antidumping Act of 1921, Ch. 14 .§ 201-12, Pub. L. No 67-10, 42 Stat. 9, 11-15.
66  Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq.
67  See  Agreement  on  Implementation of  Article VI of  the  General Agreement  on Tariff  and  Trade.
GATT, The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements, at 127 et seq (Geneva, 1986).
68  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law  103-465 [H.R. 51101; December 8,  1994.  108 STAT
4809.  See also, Joint  Report of  the Committee on Finance,  Committee on  Agriculture, Nutrition,  and
Forestry and Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate to Accompany S. 2467 103D
Congress, 2d Session, Report 103-412, November 22, 1994.
69  This endeavor resulted in Jacob Viner's  study:  Memorandum on Dumping. 3-19, L.N. Doc. C.E.C.P.
36(1), Sales No. 1926. II. 63 (1926).
70  See Swedish Anti-dumping Duties:  Report Adopted on 26 February, 1955,  BISD 35/81 in Prescatore,
P., William J. Davey and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Handbook of GATT Dispute Settlement, Release No. 4
Case 14 at [51] (New York, 1944).
71  See, GATT, Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, GATT Sales No. GATT/1958-2 11 (July 1958);
Report adopted on 13 May 1959 (L/978), GATT, BISD 8 S/145 (1960); GATT, BISD 95/194 (1961).
72  The Agreement was named "Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade."  It entered into force on July 1, 1968. For the text see, GATT, BISD 245/24 (1968).- 17 -
the  implementation  of the  GATT  AD  Code  of  1968 had  arisen.  These related  to,
among others: 73
(i)  the treatment  of "sales at a loss" in  home market  for  purposes  of calculating
domestic market  price;
(ii)  the  allowances to  be made to  the domestic  and  export  prices for  purposes  of
their comparison;
(iii)  the determination  of material injury; 74 and
(iv)  the issue of standing, viz., who could initiate the AD investigations.
The Tokyo  Round yielded a revised agreement on dumping  (Tokyo  Code).  If
the  Tokyo  Code  resolved some  issues, it  gave rise to  a whole  host  of other  issues.
During the 80s, the voices of dissatisfaction with AD laws and their application  and the
Tokyo  Code  rose  in  a mounting  crescendo.  Some  writers  instead  of  condemning
dumping  (as did  Article  VI  of  GATT  1947) instead  began  to  condemn  the  AD
measures.  No  where  are  such  sentiments  more  forcefully  articulated  than  in  the
writings  of Michael Finger.  Note some observations:
* "Antidumping  has been economic  nonsense from  its  beginning,  and  it  has
become increasingly non-sensical over its eighty-seven-year life."
- "Antidumping  has long been part of the rhetoric  of protection.
* Manipulation  of customs valuation has long been part  of the arsenal of anti-
import  weapons.
* Antidumping  is, in substance, another  clever way  to  use customs valuation
procedures as a weapon against imports.
* Antidumping  preserves all the  old  tricks  against reform  of customs
valuation,  reforms  that  now  constrain  value  for  assessment  of  ad
valorem customs duties to transactions value.
* Antidumping  makes these tricks even more powerful.  As increases of
the 'dumping  margin'  they are fully added (100 percent  rate) to  import
charges; as increases of the 'customs value' they would be added at the ad
valorem tariff rate, which even in high-tariff countries  is seldom as high
as 100 percent." 75
* "'Dumping'  became, in law as well as in practice, anything  you could get the
government to act against under the antidumping  law." 76
- * "Antidumping  is not  public policy, it is private policy.  It is a harnessing of
state power to  serve a private  interest:  a means by which  one competitor  can
73  See Stewart, supra note 36, at 1439 et seq.
74  As one can imagine the issue of what is negligible and what is material remained unresolved.  On the
difficulty of defining "material", see Grey, Rodney De C., "Some Notes on Subsidies and the International
Rules" in Wallace, supra note 39, 61 at 69.
75  Finger,  J.  Michael, The  Origins and  Evolution  of Antidumping  Regulation,  World Bank, Working
Papers, WPS 783) at 23 (October, 1991).
76  Id. at 28.- 18 -
use the  power of  the  state to  gain an edge over  another  competitor.  . .
antidumping is an instrument that one competitor can use against another -
like  advertising, product  development, or  price  discounting.  The  only
constraint is that  the  beneficiary interest must be a domestic one  and the
apparent victim a foreign one."77
- * "Antidumping is the fox put in  charge of the henhouse: trade restrictions
certified by GATT.  The fox is clever  enough not only to eat the hens, but also
to convince  the farmer that that is the way things ought to be.  Antidumping is
ordinary protection with a grand public relations  program." 78
Antidumping rules became  one of the "central issues"  at the Uruguay Round. 79
Lack of  agreement among countries on  antidumping reforms even threatened the
success of the  Round.  The new agreement, UIRAA, entered into force u  on  the
establishment of WT080 on January 1, 1995  and supersedes  the Tokyo Code.  Some
salient features of the URAA may now be noted.
VII.  URAA:  THE NUTS AND BOLTS  OF DUMPING ACTIONS
1.  Determination of Dumping
In defining what is dumping URAA follows the Tokyo Code. Thus a product
is dumped if the export price is less  than the "comparable  price, in the ordinary course
of trade, for the like product" in exporter's domestic market.  If there are no sales of
the like product in the domestic market in the ordinary course of trade or due to the
market  conditions or  low  volume  of  sales, such sales do  not  permit  a  proper
comparison, comparison  may be made with the export price to a third country or with
the  cost  of  production  in  the  country  of  origin  plus  a  reasonable amount  for
administrative, selling and general costs (ASGC) and for profits (constructed value).
The basic  idea here is the same  as in the Tokyo Code which provided little guidance  to
the national implementing  authorities in interpreting "ordinary course of trade", or in
assessing  low volume of domestic sales,  or in determining when home market sales do
not  permit  a  proper  comparison, or  in  case constructed value  were  used,  in
determining the reasonable amount of ASGC and profit.  The practices followed by
the  International  Trade  Administration  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce
82 (Commerce)  on these matters came  under strong criticism.
77  Id. at 41  .
79  Id. at 42; Finger,  supra  note 22, at 34.
Financial  Times,  at 5 (July 10, 1990).
so Article 18.4.
81  There is no express  provision  repealing  the Tokyo Code. However,  Article 18.1 of URAA provides:
"No specific  action against dumping  of exports from another  member can be taken except in accordance
with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted  by this Agreement." A footnote clarifies that this
provision  is not intended  to preclude  action  under  other  provisions  of GATT,  as appropriate.
8  Commerce's  practices  before  the adoption  of URAA  could be summarized  as follows:- 19 -
The URAA  now clarifies that where sales constitute 5% or more of sales of the
product  in the importing  country,  such sales are considered sufficient for purposes of
determining  domestic market  price.  A lower ratio should also be acceptable where the
evidence demonstrates  that domestic sales at such lower ratios are nevertheless of such
magnitude as to provide for a proper comparison. 83
If the investigating authorities determine that the export price is higher than the
domestic  market  price one  would  expect that  the  inquiry  would  end  at this  point.
This,  however,  is not  the case in practice as dumping  may still be found  in  case the
domestic  market  price is determined  to  be below the cost of production.  The reason
for this practice  is that  if the domestic market  sales are below the cost of production
then they might not be used for a fair value comparison.  This  approach can have two
consequences.  If the sales below cost are excluded, the weighted  average of domestic
price  will  be  higher  and  may  increase  the  possibility  of  a  finding  of  dumping.
Discarding such sales may also not leave enough sales above the cost of production  to
enable  the  authorities  to  determine  the  domestic  sale price,  thus  making  resort  to
constructed  price  inevitable  with  all its  disadvantages for  the  exporter.  The  U.S.
antidumping  law provided  for the  exclusion of below-cost foreign market  sales as a
basis for  determining  domestic  sale price  if  the  sales were  made  over  an  extended
period of time,  in substantial quantities, and at prices that  did not  permit  recovery of
all costs within  a reasonable  period  of time.  Consequently,  Commerce  disregarded
below cost sales if they constituted  10% or more of the sales under  consideration.  As
regards interpreting  "extended period  of time"  Commerce  would  generally disregard
below-cost sales if these sales were made in three of six months. 84
As  regards  the  sales  below  cost,  the  URAA  broadly  reflects  the  U.S.
antidumping  law with  some  modifications  (Article 2.2.1).  It  provides  that  if prices
which are below per unit costs at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit
Continued
Volume of domestic  sales: inadequate  sales were defined as home market  sales less than 5% of sales to
third markets.  19 CFR Ch. III (4-1-90 Edition), §353.49.
Ordinary course of trade:  sale would not be in ordinary course of trade if they were below cost and would,
therefore,  be disregarded  by Commerce  in case they: (i) were made  over an extended  period of time  and in
substantial  quantities  and  (ii)  were  not  at  prices  which  would  permit  recovery  of  all  costs  within  a
reasonable  period. Id. §353.5  1.
ASGC and profit: Commerce used a standard minimum of 10% of the cost for general expenses and 8% of
the cost as minimum profit.  According to Palmeter:  ". . . these statutory amounts are not surrogates for
data that are difficult to ascertain but are minimums to be used should the real amounts prove too low for
the  law's  protectionist  purposes."  Palmeter,  N.  David,  "The  Antidumping  Law:  A  Legal  and
Administrative Nontariff Barrier", in Boltuck and Litan, supra note 3, 64 at 75.
83  Article 2, footnote 2.  This is clearly a positive achievement.
84  About 60% of all antidumping cases decided in U.S. since 1980 are said to have been based in part on
allegations of sales below cost. Cass, Ronald A. and Stephen J. Narkin.  "Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Law:  The United States and GATT" in Boltuck and Litan, supra note 3, 200 at 209.  Horlick points
out that below-cost sales "have become the centerpiece of U.S. antidumping law and policy - without any
serious consideration being given to the phenomenon."  Horlick in Jackson and Vermulst, supra note 45, at
133.- 20 -
costs for the period of investigation,  such prices are to be considered  to provide for the
recovery of costs within a reasonable  period of time.  The URAA further clarifies  that
the extended period of time should normally be one year, but in no case less  than six
months. 85 The URAA further clarifies  when "sales  below per unit costs" are construed
to have been made in substantial  quantities." 86
The URAA  requires costs to  be calculated on  the basis of records kept by
exporter under investigation if they are in accordance with  the  generally accepted
accounting principles of  the  exporting countries and  reasonably reflect the  cost
associated  with production and sale  of the product under consideration. 87
There is also a provision about cost allocation. AD authorities shall consider
evidence made available  by exporter on cost allocation provided that such allocations
have  been  historically utilized,  in  particular,  in  relation  to  amortization  and
depreciation periods and allowances  for capital expenditures and other development
costs. Adjustment in costs shall be made,  among others, for circumstances  in which
costs during the period of investigations  are affected by start-up operations.  In this
respect again URAA makes a significant  improvement over the Tokyo Code. 88
The use of arbitrary statutory minimum for ASGC and profits by  national
antidumping authorities in  computing constructed domestic sale price will now no
longer be possible under the URAA.  Article 2.2.2 of URAA requires that ASGC
and  profits  shall  be  based on  actual  data  of  the  exporter  or  producer  under
investigation. If such a determination is not possible,  resort may be had, as prescribed,
to the amounts incurred or realized  by exporter or producer in question for sales  of the
same general category of products, or the weighted average of amounts incurred or
realized by other exporters under investigation  for the domestic sale of like product.
The authorities may use any other reasonable  method also, but the amount of profits
so established shall not  exceed the profit  normally realized by  other  exporters or
producers on sales  of product of the same  general category  in the domestic market.
85  Article  2 footnote  4.
86  Article  2 footnote  5.
87  On accounting,  Boltuck  and Litan felt that respondent's  task to comply  with the information  required
by Commerce may be "complicated  by the fact that foreign companies  may use different accounting
conventions  than  those required  for data submission  by the Commerce  Department." See Boltuck,  Richard
and Robert  E. Litan supra  note 3, 1 at 17.
88  However,  the failure  of URAA  to define  start-up  period  has not gone unnoticed. See, Horlick,  Gary  N.
and Eleanor C. Shea,  "The World  Trade Organization  Antidumping  Agreement"  29 J.W.T. 5 at 26 (1995,
February).
89  See on this supra  note 82.- 21 -
2.  Export Price
The  export  price  may  also  be  constructed  where  it  appears  to  the  AD
authorities  that  export  price  is unreliable  because of  association or  a compensatory
arrangement  between exporter  and importer  or  a third  party.  In such a case the  basis
for  construction  is  the  price  at  which  imported  products  are  first  resold  to  an
independent  buyer,  or if  the product  is not  resold  to  an  independent  buyer  or  not
resold in  the  condition  as imported,  on  such reasonable basis as the  AD  authorities
may determine.
3.  Adjustments
The next step is the comparison to be made between the domestic price and the
export price for determining the dumping margin.  For this purpose it will be useful to
keep the  following equation in mind:
Domestic Price  Export Price  Margin of
or  minus  Dumping
Home  Market Price
The URAA  stipulates a "fair comparison"  of the two prices.  Surprisingly,  the
idea of "fair comparison" is not  expressly stipulated in many national AD laws.  If the
"fair comparison"  requirement  is expressly provided for  in the  national  legislation, it
perhaps  could,  to  some  extent,  check  some  of  the  abuses  that  take  place  in  the
comparison process.
A number  of adjustments  in these prices are allowed with  the  idea "to ensure
that  they  are  compared  at  proper  level,  that  the  comparison  is  one  of  apples to
apples.""  The URAA  provides some but  not enough guidance in this respect.  Thus it
requires  that  comparison  shall be  made at the  same level of trade,  normally  at  ex-
factory  level, and in respect of sales made at nearly the same time.  Due allowance is
made for differences that  affect price comparability including, differences in conditions
and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities and physical characteristics.
With little to guide them  except for the fair comparison standard which in turn
is generally not even mentioned in the legislation, the municipal authorities,  in making
price adjustments, have adopted methodologies which  stacked up the cards against the
91 exporters.
90  Palmeter, supra note 82, at 76.
91  On this see, Horlick, supra note 84 at 146; Palmeter, supra note 82, at 76.- 22 -
4.  Comparison
A significant improvement  has been made by the  UIRAA in the methodology
for comparing the domestic sale price and the export price to determine  the margin of
dumping.  The  Agreement  provides  that  the  dumping  margin  is  "normally"  to  be
established by comparing weighted average of domestic price with  weighted average of
all  comparable  export  prices  or  by  comparison  of  prices  on  transaction  - to  -
transaction  basis.  Weighted  average domestic  sales prices  may  be  compared  with
individual export transactions if authorities find a pattern  of export prices which  differ
significantly  among  different  purchasers,  regions  or  times  and  if  an  explanation  is
provided  why  such differences cannot  be taken  into  account  in weighted-to-weighted
92 or transaction-to-transaction  comparison.
5.  De Minimis  Dumping Margin
Article  5.8 of U7RAA  requires the termination  of antidumping investigations if
dumping margins are found to be de minimis, which  is defined as less than  2% of the
export  price.  Also,  investigation  shall be  immediately  terminated  where  volume  of
dumped imports is negligible, i.e., if such volume from a particular  country  is less than
3% of imports in the country, unless countries which individually account for less than
3% of imports  collectively account for more than 7% of imports  of the like product.93
In this respect also the URAA  makes a very positive advance.
6.  Determination  of injury
Mere  existence of  dumping  is not  sufficient  for  levying  antidumping  duty.
Dumping  must  also result  in material  injury  to  domestic  industry  producing  a  like
product.
The  URAA  requires  injury  determination  to  be based  on  positive  evidence.
This  involves the examination  of the  volume of dumped imports  and their  effect on
domestic  prices  of  like  product  and  the  consequent  impact  of  these  imports  on
92  The practice of comparing  weighted average of domestic  sale price with individual  export prices
followed  by Commerce  led to severest  criticism  and charge of protectionist  bias. It was pointed out that
even where both prices were identical  but varying  over a period of time, the comparison  would yield a
dumping  margin in sales where  the individual  export  price is lower  than the weighted  average  of domestic
sales  price. Thus Palmeter  observed:
"Average prices in both markets or average prices in neither.  The present methodology of
comparing  individual  export  prices  to weighted  average  home market  (or third-country)  prices is unfairness
in its rankest form. It is perhaps the most blatant  kind of deck-stacking  that goes on in an antidumping
proceeding. There  is no justification  for it." Id. at 85.
93  Prior to the entry into force  of URAA,  the practice  of Commerce  to treat dumping  margin of less  than
0.5%  as de minimis thus allowing  for imposition  of antidumping  duty where the dumping  margin was
0.5%  had been generally  criticized. It had been unsuccessfully  recommended  that the U.S. raise the limit
to 5%. See Palmeter,  id. at 87.- 23  -
domestic producers. By injury is meant material injury to domestic  industry, threat of
material injury to  a domestic industry or material retardation to  establishment of a
domestic industry. 94 In examining the effect of such imports, the  authorities must
consider whether there has been a significant  price-undercutting  by dumped imports,
or the prices are depressed  significantly  or price increases,  which otherwise  would have
occurred, were  prevented to  a  significant degree, or  whether  there  has been  a
significant increase  either in absolute terms or in relation to domestic production or
consumption.  For  considering the impact on  domestic industry, the  factors to  be
considered are:  actual and potential decline in output, sales, profits, market share,
productivity,  return  on  investments, or  utilization  of  capacity; factors affecting
domestic prices, magnitude of margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,  growth, and the ability to raise capital
or investments. This list is not exhaustive  and no one or several of these factors can
necessarily  give  decisive  guidance.
Notwithstanding the various tests prescribed in the URAA and the national
AD  statutes, the  determination of what constitutes "material" remains a  difficult
issue.9  It is, therefore, correctly maintained that despite "continuing improvements,
the injury side of the Agreement remains far less developed  than the dumping side.
Basic injury-related concepts are not well-enough  defined and the practicalities  of the
Contracting Parties differ greatly. The recent adoption of the Uruguay Round results
will not really alter this situation."96
7.  Cumulation
The URAA also legitimizes  the practice of cumulating imports from various
countries for determining injury - a practice that developed  in EU 97 and the  U.S. 98
Cumulation, however, has always been unfair to small exporters  whose exports would
not have caused  injury but for having  been cumulated  with exports of other exporters.
But  cumulation  is  not  without  some  rationale.  As  Horlick  points  out:
94  In the U.S. the ITC  considers 18 factors in determining material injury.  See on this Boltuck, Richard
"Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price Dumping" in Tharakan, supra note 28, 99 at 114-
115.  ITC commissioners have adopted 5 different approaches in reaching material injury determinations.
See  Kaplan,  Seth  "Injury  and  Causation  in  U.S.  ITC  Antidumping  Determinations:  Five  Recent
Approaches", id. 143 et seq.
Horlick points that in the U.S. finding of injury will always be a matter of ITC discretion.  "The greatest
amount of legislative work, both internationally and in the U.S. on any single word in the antidumping law
is the word 'material'  preceding injury."  Horlick, supra note 84, at 158. On the subjective aspect of injury
finding, see also Boltuck, Richard and Robert E. Litan, supra note 3 at 17.
96  Pangratis, Angelos  and Edwin  Vermulst, "Injury  in Anti-Dumping Proceedings,  The Need to Look
Beyond the Uruguay Round Results", 28 J.W.T. 61 at 94 (1994, October).
9B  Bellis, Jean Fransois, "The EEC Antidumping System", in Jackson and Vermulst, supra note 45, at 92-
93.
98  Some doubt as to the consistency of the practice of cumulating imports with U.S. law was expressed by
Horlick.  See, Horlick, supra note 84, at 162.- 24  -
"[Nievertheless,  there is an understandable  view that being injured in many nibbles at
once is just as bad as being injured in one large bite." 99
The URAA  permits cumulation  provided imports are simultaneously subject to
investigations,  the margin  of dumping for each country  is more than de minimis,  the
volume  of imports  is not  negligible and a determination  is made that  cumulation  of
imports  is  appropriate  in  light  of  competition  between  imported  jroducts  and  of
competition  between imported  products  and like domestic products.'0
8.  Causal  Relationship
There  must  be causal relationship  between the  injury  and dumped  imports.10 1
To the extent  injury  results from  other factors such as the volume  and prices of non-
dumped  imports,  contraction  in  demand  or  changes in  the  pattern  of consumption,
trade  practices  of,  and  competition  between,  the  foreign  and  domestic  producers,
developments  in  technology,  and  the  export  performance  and  productivity  of  the
domestic industr,y -such injury must be discounted from the determination  of material
injury.  102
9.  Threat of Injury
ADD  may be  imposed if  dumping  is causing material  injury  or  threatens  to
cause material  injury to  domestic industry  or materially retards1 03 the establishment  of
industry.  Filing  a complaint  alleging a mere  "threat"  is full of difficulties  and  can
easily, in turn,  lead to abuse.
Article  3.7 of URAA  stipulates  that  a threat  of injury  shall be based on  facts
and  not  merely  on  allegation,  conjecture  or  remote  possibility.  The  change  in
circumstances  which  would  create a situation  in  which  dumping  would  cause injury
must  be clearly foreseen and imminent.  For  example, if there is convincing reason to
believe that  there  will be, in the immediate future,  substantially increased imports  of
the  product  at  dumped  prices.  Article  3.7  of  URAA  prescribes  four  factors  as
illustrative  of  what  the  authorities  should  consider to  make  a determination  of the
existence of a threat  of material injury.  These are:
99  Id.
100  Article 3.3.
'O'  The URAA stipulates that it "must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effect of
dumping . . . causing injury . . ." Article 3.5.  In this respect, URAA mirrors the provision of the Tokyo
Code.  Horlick points out that causation is the "source of the most heated arguments in the  antidumping
area."  Horlick, supra note 84, at 161.
102  Perhaps, in this  respect the  most stringent text was contained in the  GATT AD  Code  of  1968.  It
required that imports had to be "demonstrably the primary cause" of injury.
103  What constitutes "material retardation" is not defined in URAA or municipal AD statutes.  Allegations
of material retardation of the establishment of an industry are not very common.  See e.g., Benzyl  Paraben
from Japan, Inv. No. 731-Ta-462, (Final), USITIC Pub. 2355 (Feb. 1991).- 25 -
(a)  a significant rate  of increase  of dumped  imports  indicating  the  likelihood  of
substantially increased importation;
(b)  substantial  increase  in  the  capacity  of  the  exporter  indicating  likelihood  of
substantially increased dumped exports to domestic markets taking into account
availability of other export market to absorb additional exports;
(c)  whether imports  are entering  at prices that will have a significant depressing or
suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would  increase demand  for  further
imports; and
(d)  inventories of the product being investigated.
The list of factors to be considered is not exhaustive consequently national laws
may include other factors which  are not  mentioned  in the URAA.  As determination
of threat  is potentially  a very  controversial  matter  the  URAA  warns  that  in  cases
where  injury  is  threatened  by  dumped  imports,  the  application  of  antidumping
measures shall be considered and decided with special care.
10.  Standing
The  URAA  requires that  an  antidumping  investigation  may not  be  initiated
unless the authorities  have determined,  on the basis of an examination  of the degree of
support  for, or opposition  to, the application,  expressed by domestic producers  of the
like  product,  that  the  application  has been filed  "by  or  on  behalf  of the  domestic
industry."104
The  application  must  be  supported  by  domestic  producers  whose  collective
output  constitutes more than 50% of the total production  of the like product  produced
by that portion  of the domestic industry  expressing either support for or opposition  to
the application.  No  investigation  shall be initiated  if the proportion  supporting  the
application produces less than 25% of the total  production  of the domestic industry. 105
Producers  who  are themselves involved in the importing  of the dumped products  or
are related to  exporters  or  importers  may be ignored.  As a result of this  provision,
national  authorities  will  have to  seriously  investigate that  the  petitioners  have the
required  standing  to  complain.  With  increasing  cross-border  investments  by
multinationals  a question arises whether a foreign multinational  corporation  operating
104  Article  5.4.
105 Earlier  on Commerce  had taken  the position  that "standing  exists for any petition  filed unless  a majority
of the industry  shows  opposition." Thus  where Commerce  found  standing  "it had no idea what proportion
of the domestic  industry  supported  the petition." Horlick,  supra note 84, at 154. Pursuant  to the URAA,
the U.S. AD law is amended  requiring  Commerce  to poll the industry  if the petition does not establish
support of domestic  producers  or workers accounting  for more  than 50 percent  of the total production  of
the domestic  like  product. 19 U.S.C.  1671  a(c)(4)(D)  and 1673  a(c)(4)(D),  as amended  by Uruguay  Round
Agreements  Act.- 26 -
in a country in which dumping  is alleged  would be considered  a member of the
domestic  industry. The URAA  does  not throw much  light  on this issue.'06
11.  Application  for Investigation
The URAA  provides  far more  detailed  rules  as to the content of application  for
initiating  the investigation  than its predecessor  the Tokyo Code. The application  is
required to include evidence  of dumping, injury and causal  link between  dumped
imports and alleged  injury.  Information to  be provided in the application relates to:
(a)  the identity  of applicant,  volume  and value  of domestic  production  of like product
by the applicant. If the application  is made  on behalf  of the industry,  applicant  shall
provide  pertinent  information  relating  to other producers;  (b)  complete  description  of
dumped  product,  names  of exporting  countries,  identity  of known  exporters  or foreign
producers,  list of known importers  of the product;  (c)  information  on prices,  inter alia,
for which the product  is sold in exporter's  domestic  market;  and (d)  information  on
evolution  of volume  of imports,  effect  of these  imports  in prices  in domestic  market
and consequent  impact of imports  on domestic  industry. Some  other improvements
made  by URAA  in this regard  include:
1.  The authorities shall examine  the accuracy  and adequacy  of the evidence
provided  in the application  to determine  whether  there is sufficient  evidence  to
justify  the initiation  of an investigation.
2.  The authorities  shall  avoid  any publicizing  of the application  unless  a decision
has  been  made  to initiate  an investigation.
3.  An application  shall be rejected  and an investigation  terminated  promptly if
authorities  concerned  are satisfied  that there is insufficient  evidence  of either
dumping or injury.  There shall be immediate  termination  where dumping
margin is de minimis, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or
potential,  or injury  is negligible.
4.  Only in special  circumstances  can  investigations  extend  beyond  one year and in
no event  beyond  eighteen  months  after  their initiation.
106 In U.S., ITC has developed  a test to determine  whether  a petitioner  has standing  under  the antidumping
statute  when it is challenged  that the petitioner  is not a domestic  manufacturer. This  test has the following
six elements:
(1) the extent and source of a company's  capital investment;  (2) the technical  expertise  involved in the
production activity in the United States; (3) the value-added  to the product in the United States; (4)
employment  levels;  (5)  the quantity  and types of parts sourced  in the United  States;  and (6) any other  costs
and activities  in the United States  directly  leading  to production  of the like product. Of course,  no single
element  is determinative  nor is the test exhaustive.  See,  Jerge,  Martin  "Foreign  Multinational  Corporations
and U.S.  Antidumping  Law-Defining  a Domestic  Business",  28 J.W.T.  67 at 70 (1994).- 27 -
12.  Provisional Measures
Once  a  preliminary  affirmative  decision  has  been  made  as to  dumping  and
injury, and if in the judgment  of the authorities it is necessary to prevent injury during
the  investigation  period,  provisional  antidumping  measures  may  be  taken.  Such
measures may take the  form  of a provisional  duty  or  preferably  a security  (by cash
deposit or bond) equal to the amount  of ADD provisionally  calculated; withholding  of
appraisement  is also recommended  as an appropriate provisional measure.  The URAA
makes considerable improvement  to the existing legal provisions  by stipulating that  no
provisional  measure  shall  be  applied  prior  to  60  days  after  the  initiation  of
investigation.1 07 A  further  improvement  consists  of  the  specific  requirement  that
provisional  measures shall be limited for as short  a period as possible and in any  case
not  to  exceed 4 months,  except upon  request  of exporters  representing  a significant
percentage  of the trade  in which  case the period  shall not  exceed six months.  These
time-limits may be extended to 6 and 9 months,  respectively, in limited situations.
13.  Price Undertakings
An  alternative  to  antidumping  duty  which  the  URAA  like  its  predecessor
allows and which  has been extensively used in the EU  is the  voluntary  undertakings
from the exporter. 108 The authorities may suspend or terminate  the proceedings if the
exporter  enters into  voluntary  undertakings  to  revise its  price or to  cease exports  at
dumped prices.  It is desirable that price increases are less than the margin of dumping
if they  would  be  adequate to  remove the  injury,  but  they  shall not  be higher  than
necessary to  eliminate the margin of dumping.  Price undertakings  shall not be sought
before preliminary  affirmative determination  of dumping and injury.1 09
Authorities  are  not  obligated  to  accept undertakings,  if  their  acceptance is
impractical,  for example, if the number of actual or potential  exporters is too great, or
due to considerations of general policy or any other reason."o
After  an undertaking  has been accepted, the proceedings may be completed  if
the  exporter  so desires or  the  authorities  so decide.  If the  result  is that  a negative
107  Article 7.3.  This will dampen the ardor of protectionist interests who advocate imposition of
provisional  duties as early as possible.  Earlier in Mexico a  first provisional  duty determination  was
permitted within 5 working days of the initiation  of the investigation. This was followed  by a second
provisional  duty and then a final duty.  See on this Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization
Measures  by Mexico  and Prospects  for Future United States-Mexican  Relations. Investigation  No. 332-
282.  Phase I:  Recent Trade and Investment  Reforms  Undertaken  by Mexico  and Publications  for the
United States. USITC Pub. 2275 at 412 et seq. (1990).
108  In EU undertakings were initially quite popular but their exact details were not made public.  See Bael,
Ivo Van, "Ten Years of EEC Anti-Dumping Enforcement",  13 J.W.T.L. 395 (1979).  For the reversal of
the initial trend, see Bellis, supra note 97 at 52 et seq.
109 Article 8.2.
110 Article 8.3.-28  -
finding of dumping or injury is made, the undertaking shall lapse.  If, on the other
hand, dumping and injury is found, the undertaking shall continue.
14.  Retroactivity
The general rule, subject to  some exceptions, is that  (i) provisional measures
shall only be applied to products which enter for consumption after the decision to
apply  such  measures  following  investigation  and  preliminary  affirmative
determinations of dumping and injury enter into force; and (ii) ADD shall be applied
to products which enter for consumption after the decision to apply the same enters
into  force. 1"1 ADD  may be applied retroactively for the  period for  which  the
provisional measures  applied in all those cases  in which a final determination is made
of  injury  (as distinguished from  determination of  threat  of  injury  or  material
retardation of establishment  of an industry)  112. The definitive  ADD may be applied on
imports entering not more than 90 days  prior to date of application  of provisional  duty
if authorities determine that there is history of dumping and the injury is caused by
massive  dumped imports in a relatively  short time which will undermine the remedial
effect of ADD.' 13 Retroactivity in no circumstance  extends beyond the date of the
initiation of the investigation  and, therefore, the goods entering prior to such date will
not be captured by the ADD.114
15.  Refund
The URAA contains detailed rules applicable to the  refund of duties.  The
practice as to refund has varied considerably  in State practice and it had become almost
impossible  for an importer to get refund in the EU system. 115 URAA requires that if
the  definitive ADD  is  lower than  the  provisional duty,  the  difference shall be
reimbursed. 1 16 Cash deposited during the application of provisional measures  should
be refunded in  case the  final determination is negative. 117 Where the  amount  of
antidumping duty is assessed  on a retrospective  basis, refund should be made within 90
"'  Article 10.1.
112  Article 10.2.
113  Article 10.6. Bellis  points  out that although  ADD has not been applied retroactively  in the EU, there
was a growing  trend  of complainants  seeking  such action. See Bellis,  supra  note 97, at 57.
114  Article 10.8.
115  See, however,  McGovern  who points out that it takes about three years to get refund.  McGovern,
Edmond,  "EC Anti-dumping  Legislation  and Practices  in Uruguay  Round" (Further Papers on Selected
Issues), U.N. Publication,  Library call no. K 3943.A337  U78 (1990) 205 at 213. On EU practice,  see also
Rowat,  Malcolm  D., "Protectionist  Tilts in Antidumping  Legislation  of Developed  Countries  and the LDC
Response:  Is the 'Race to the Bottom' Inevitable?",  24 J.W.T. offprint, at 9 (1990).  See, generally,
Vermulst,  Edwin A., Antidumping  Law  and Practice  in the United States  and the European  Communities,
A Comparative  Analysis  at 252-254  (1987).
6  Article 10.3.
117  Article 10.5.- 29 -
days from the determination of final liability." 1 8 In case of prospective assessment  of
antidumping duty, refund of amount in excess  of the actual dumping margin should
normally take place within 12 months but not later than 18 months from the request
for refund.  The authorized refund should be made within 90 days of the decision. 1 19
These provisions  provide a much-needed  discipline  in the area of refund.
16.  Imposition and Collection  of Antidumping Duty
Under the URAA it is not mandatory to impose ADD where all conditions for
imposition are met and it leaves  the decision on the matter to the national authorities.
The URAA states that it is desirable  that the imposition  be permissive  by the Members
and the duty be less than the margin if such lesser  duty would be adequate to remove
the injury to the domestic  industry.1 20
The duty must be collected on  a non-discriminatory basis from all sources
found to be dumping and causing  injury except from those whose price undertakings
have been accepted.  The suppliers subject to  duty shall be named.  In case a large
number of suppliers  is involved  and it is not practical  to name them then the exporting
country may be named. If several  suppliers  from more than one country are involved
then all suppliers may be named, and if that is impractical,  all the supplying countries
involved.' 1
In cases  where some of several exporters are selected  for examination,  the duty
shall not exceed  the weighted average  margin of dumping established  with respect to
selected exporters or producers.1 22
17.  New Exporters
Under the EU system, exporters  who enter the market after the imposition of
the ADD are hit the hardest.  Such exporters are required to pay the highest ADD
imposed in the case. 123 The situation is made worse in that the EU no longer accepts
undertakings from exporters who did not export during the period of investigation. 124
Article 9.5 of URAA stipulates that  a prompt  review shall be carried out for the
118  Article  9.3.1.
"1  Article  9.3.2.
120  Article  9.1.
121  Article  9.2.
122  Article  9.4(i).
123  In the words of Piontek: ".  . . individual  rates of duty are usually  determined  by the Commission  for
each exporting  company  under investigation.  The highest  individual  rate of duty imposed  is also made  the
general rate, which applies  to any exporter  for which  there is no individual  rate of duty. Obviously,  this
can be very serious for a company  which had no exports during  the period being investigated,  but which
intends to  export to the EEC subsequently."  According to Piontek, this practice provides "overly
protective  edge" to the EU antidumping  system. See,  Piontek,  supra  note 38, at 73.
124  Sodium  Carbonate,  OJ (1984) L206/15  referred  to in Bellis, supra  note  97, at 56.- 30 -
purpose of determining individual  margins of dumping for "any exporters or producers
in  the  exporting country in  question who have not  exported the  product  to  the
importing member during the  period of  investigation."  The burden  is on  such
exporters to show that they are not related  to those who are subject to the duty.  This
review is required to be conducted  on an accelerated  basis. No ADD shall be levied  on
such exporters during investigation.  However, appraisement may be withheld or
guarantees  may be requested in such cases. The requirement to  determine individual
margin of dumping for new exporters  provides  a much-needed  relief  to such exporters.
18.  Duration of Antidumping Duties and Undertakings
Up until 1984,  the duration of ADD in EU and the U.S. was unlimited. In that
year the "sunset" provision was introduced in the EU which provided that the duty
and undertakings shall lapse after five years after the  date  on  which  they  were
introduced or last modified or confirmed.  The practices of various countries varied
considerably.125  Under Article 11 of URAA the general  rule is that ADD shall remain
in force only as long as and to the extent necessary  to counteract dumping which is
causing injury.  The continuation of ADD may be reviewed by the authorities at any
time at their own initiative or after a lapse of reasonable  time, on the request of any
interested party.  If the review leads to  a determination that the duty is no longer
warranted, it shall  be terminated  forthwith.
The URAA establishes  5 years for the duration of ADD since its imposition or
review unless before expiry of 5 years a review determines  that expiry of antidumpinE
duty  would  likely lead to  continuation or  recurrence of  dumping and  injury. 
Despite this possibility the establishment  of 5 years as the maximum period ought to
be recognized  as a significant  gain  emerging  from the Uruguay Round.
19.  Public Notice and Explanation of Determination
The  URAA  has considerably strengthened the  transparency of procedural
requirements for antidumping cases. Thus it requires that Members the products of
which are to be the subject of investigation as well as other interested parties must be
notified and  a public notice given when authorities have decided to  initiate the
proceedings. The public notice shall contain information as to:
(i)  the name of the exporting  country or countries;
(ii)  the product involved;
(iii)  the basis on which dumping is alleged;
125  Prior to the URAA, the periods for reviewing  the continued need for the duty, were as follows:
Australia,  2 years; Austria, I year; Canada,  5 years; EU, 5 years, U.S., no automatic  time limit.  With a
view to bringing the U.S. law in line  with URAA,  Section  751 of the 1930  Tariff Act has been amended.
The Amended  Section  75  1  (c) requires  Commerce  and ITC  to conduct  a "sunset"  review  every five years.
126  Article 11.3.- 31 -
(iv)  the date of initiation of investigation;
(v)  the summary of factors  on which injury is alleged;
(vi)  the address to which representations  by interested parties should be directed;
and
(vii)  the time allowed  to interested  parties  to making their views known.1 27
Public notice should also be given of all preliminary and final determinations as
to dumping and injury, any decision to accept an undertaking and its termination and
of the revocation of a determination.  Each notice shall set forth or otherwise make
available through a separate report sufficient details of the findings and conclusions
reached on  all material issues of fact and law.  All such notices and  reports are
furnished to  the  Member the product of which is subject to  investigation and the
interested parties.  Likewise, notices of provisional measures and of conclusion or
suspension of an investigation as to  definitive duty are also to  be given.  A public
notice of the termination or suspension  of an investigation  following  acceptance  of an
undertaking  is to  include the  non-confidential part  of the  undertaking.1 28 This
provision provides a much-needed  transparency  in this area.
20.  Judicial Review
Members having antidumping legislation  are required to maintain independent
judicial, arbitral, administrative tribunals or procedures for, inter  alia, the  prompt
review of  administrative actions relating to  final determinations and decisions of
relating to  the  duration  of  ADD  or  undertakings.1 29 Availability of  a  review
mechanism is unquestionably desirable for any system but  it would appear to  be
particularly so for a system in which the determinations of dumping as well as of
injury are made by a single  entity.
21.  Best  Information Available
Annex II of the URAA is devoted entirely to the methodology involving the
use of the "best information available"  (BIA). To understand the nature of the issue,  it
should be noted that for making their determinations  the investigative  authorities issue
a questionnaire to the exporters soon after the initiation of the investigation.' 30 But
127  Article  12.1.1.
128  Article 12.2.3.
129  Article 13.
130  In the U.S.,  a complaint has been that the  questionnaire is too lengthy and cumbersome.  Palmeter
points out that the length of the first questionnaire given to foreign exporters in each of years  1987, 88, 89
and 90 was 52, 73,  128 and 158 pages respectively.  See Palmeter, supra note 82, at 64-65.  Not only is the
questionnaire said to be complex, it seeks a lot of  information on home market sales and  sales to third
countries.  Commerce now requires response on computer tape in a specified format.  Computerized sales
are required  to be  submitted on eight-track computer tape in flat file or  text format.  "Computer  tapes
meeting the Department's  requirements cannot be magically created from the company's  existing record-
keeping system by simply pushing a button.  The Company's  raw data must be  sorted, synthesized, and- 32 -
the national investigating authorities, such as the Commerce, may lack the subpoena
powers for obtaining the necessary  information. The U.S. law, therefore, provided for
the  use  of  "best  information"  to  induce  the  exporters  to  provide  accurate
information. 131 In the U.S., thus, if information cannot be verified or is submitted late
or is in the wrong form, the exporter or manufacturer concerned will be notified and
the Commerce will make its determination on the basis of BIA.  If time permitted,
Commerce could provide an opportunity to correct the information. However, it has
been alleged that  the  demands being made are  so onerous that  more  and  more
companies  even of the stature of Matsushita,  and Toshiba had failed  to meet the burden
of furnishing the information, 132 thereby increasing resort by  Commerce to  BIA' 33
which at times is nothing more that the information furnished by the complainant. In
the U.S., courts have generally  upheld the use of BIA by Commerce.134  Due to  the
criticism that from the exporter's point of view BIA methodology often worked as the
"worst information available",  it was only appropriate that the issue  were addressed  by
the URAA.  Article 6(8) of the Tokyo Code recognized  the use of BIA, but provided
no further guidelines. The URAA, on the other hand, specifies  various rules in that
respect.  The authorities may request information on a computer tape but not on a
system other than the one used by the other party.  The authority should not maintain
a  request for  computerized response if  the  party  concerned does not  maintain
computerized accounts and if presenting the requested information would result in
unreasonable extra burden on it.  If under these circumstances  a party fails to provide
computerized information, then, it should not be considered to significantly impede
the investigation. URAA, Annex II, paragraph 5 may limit the wide discretion the
national authorities had hitherto enjoyed of rejecting  the information furnished by the
exporters. Thus it is stipulated  that even though the information provided may not be
ideal in  all  respects, this  should not  justify the  authorities from  disregarding it,
provided the interested party has acted  to the best of its ability. Where the authorities
rely on the information provided by the complainant,  they should do so with "special
Continued
amended  in order  to meet DOC requirements  and expectations." See  Anderson,  Charles  L. and Thomas  L.
Rogers,  "Preparing  the  Computerized  Portions  of  an  Antidumping  Questionnaire  Response,"  in
Georgetown  Univ.  L.  Center,  The  Annual  International  Trade  Conference:  The  Litigation  of  an
Antidumping Case.  A Practitioner's  Workshop 123 at 126 (June 4-5,  1992).  Respondents may thus be
subject to additional expense and inconvenience.  Failure to provide information on tape was held to justify
Commerce's resort to BIA.  See Rhone Poulenc v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 341, at 346-47 (CIT  1989),
Affirmed, 899 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
13S  section  776 of the Tariff Act 1930 stipulated that if the Commerce is unable to verify the accuracy of
the information submitted, it shall use the best information available to it as the basis for its actions which
may include the information submitted by the complainant.
132 Palmeter, supra note 82, at 70.
133  See comments of Pietro S. Nivola in Boltuck and Litan, Down in the Dumps, supra note 3, at 280.
Baldwin and Moore maintain that a dumping margin based on BIA is on average higher (66.7%) than that
based on the questionnaire of foreign firms (27.9%).  Baldwin, Robert E. and Michael 0.  Moore "Political
Aspects of the Administration of the Trade Remedy Laws."  See id. 253 at 269-70.
134  See Ansaldo Componenti, S.p.a. v United States 628 F. Supp. 198. (Commerce may refuse to consider
information  supplied after the  time specified for submitting the  information  expires, and thus  may  use
BIA.)  Seattle Marine Fishing Supply Co. v United States, 679 F Supp. 1119 at 1127-28.  (The CIT relying
upon Ansaldo Componenti upheld Commerce's rejection of untimely questionnaire responses.)- 33 -
circums 1ection", and wherever practicable, check the information from independent
sources.
22.  Circumvention
One of the problems with ADD on a product has been the circumvention of
the duty by, inter alia, importing parts and reassembling  the product in the importing
country or by making minor alterations to the product subject to antidumping order.
To prevent circumvention,  EU1 36 was the first to make a legislative  provision followed
by  the  U.S.1 37 Anti-circumvention action, in  effect, amounts to  imposing ADD
without investigation  of dumping or injury.  The "parts amendment" was challenged
by Japan at the GATT as it was first invoked against  Japanese  companies  with facilities
in EU.  A GATT panel found EU regulation violated Article III of GATT 1947.138
The EU did not block the adoption of the panel report but wanted its reconsideration.
As  expected, the  circumvention problem was taken up  at the  Uruguay  Round.
However, due to lack of agreement  the issue  was deferred. At Marrakech the Ministers
adopted a  decision which  acknowledged lack  of  agreement on  the  problem  of
circumvention and referred the matter to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
established  under URAA for resolution as early as possible.' 39
23.  Anti-Dumping Committee
Part II of the URAA establishes  the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices.
Members are required to  report without delay to the Committee all preliminary or
final antidumping actions.  This report will be open for inspection of government
representatives.  Members shall also submit,  on  a  semi-annual basis, reports  of
antidumping actions taken within the preceding six months.  Each Member must
inform the Committee of its antidumping procedures as well as any changes in  its
antidumping laws and regulations  as well as other relevant laws and procedures.
135  A new Section  782(e)  has now  been added  to U.S.  Tariff  Act, 1930,  requiring  that Commerce  and ITC
may not decline  to consider information  which  does not meet all the requirements  established  therefor if:
(i) the information  is submitted  within  the established  deadline,  (ii) it can be verified  to the extent  required
by law, (iii) it is not so incomplete  that it cannot serve as a reliable basis for reaching the required
determination,  (iv) the respondent  has demonstrated  that it has acted  to the best of its ability in providing
the information  and meeting  the requirements,  and (v) it can be used without  undue  difficulties.
136  Council Regulation  No. 1761/87  of June 1987 amending  Regulation  No. 2176/84 of 23 July 1984
("parts  amendment"). Prior to URAA  the provision  appeared  as Article  13(10)  of Council  Regulation  No.
2423/88 of 11  July 1988.
137  Tariff Act of 1930. § 781 as amended  by the Omnibus  Trade  and Competitiveness  Act of 1988,  Pub.
L. No.  100-418  § 1321,  102 Stat 1107,  1192-95.  Section 781 has been further  amended although  no
definitive  agreement  on anticircumvention  was reached  at the Uruguay  Round.
138  EEC - Regulation  on Imports  of Parts and Components,  Report  by the Panel, GATT  Doc. No. L/6657
at 66 et seq (March  22, 1990).
139  A view  has been expressed that if the matter is not resolved in the near  future, it might  encourage
unilateral adoption of anti-circumvention  provisions.  McNamara,  Tim and Edwin Vermulst, "Special
Trade  Law Issues  in the EC for Assembly  Products",  28 J.W.T.  83 at 100  (1994).- 34 -
24.  Dispute Settlement
The dispute settlement  mechanism of GATT  1947 has often been criticized.1 40
The report  of a panel set up by the GATT  CONTRACTING  PARTIES in respect of
a  dispute  could  be  blocked  from  being  adopted  by  any  Contracting  Party  to  the
dispute.  In the  case of antidumping,  out  of 5 cases in  which  panels submitted  their
reports  only in 2 was the  report  adopted.  Some pessimism about the effectiveness of
dispute settlement  mechanism in relation to challenges to antidumping  measures stems
from  the  reports  in  two  recent  cases  in  which  the  panels  while  holding  the
antidumping  measures inconsistent  with  the Tokyo  Code nonetheless did  not  revoke
the duty.141 Finger and Fung say:
"The  conclusion is obvious - and ominous.  The  GATT  dispute
settlement  process  seems  unlikely  to  provide  discipline  against  the
increasing  number  of antidumping  restrictions  against imports.  Both
the  bureaucratic  and the legal momentum  of GATT  dispute settlement
are toward  innocuous  findings of procedural  error  that can be corrected
without  lifting the antidumping order in question.
Changing the bureaucratic momentum  of the system is possible,
but it would  not be easy.  Changing the legal momentum  of the system
will be even more difficult.  Interpreting  the GATT  in a legalistic way
compels  one  to  interpret  it  as  a  statement  of  rights  to  impose
antidumping  duties.  The substantive criteria for action  are broad  - the
injury concept  justifies protection  for  anyone to  whom  it is worth  the
time to ask for it.  The constraints on antidumping  actions are artificial -
loopholes and  procedural  technicalities  - so legal reform  means getting
rid of them.
In sum, where  do the GATT  articles on trade  remedies lead us?
If you take a legalistic view, you come to a protectionist  conclusion." 142
A closer examination  of the two  panel reports  which seem to  have driven the
two  writers  to  the  view  that  the  panels  would  lean toward  innocuous  findings  of
procedural  errors  that  can be corrected  rather  than  lift the  challenged antidumping
140  Hilf, Meinhard, "Settlement  of Disputes in International  Economic Organizations: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures" in Petersmann, Ernst-
Ulrich and Meinhard Hilf, The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal and Economic
Problems, 285 at 300-1 (1991).
141  See Finger, J. Michael and Kwok-Chiu Fung, "Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping?"  9
Jn'l  Econo. Integration,  198 (1994).  The authors pointedly refer to the  GATT Panel Reports  in United
States - Salmon from Norway (1992) and Korea - Polyacetyl Resins from the United States (1993), at 204.
T42  Id.  at 211.- 35 -
measure, would  show  that  the panel recommendations  were  appropriate,  and, in  the
circumstances, at least in one case, in accordance with the complainant's  request.
In  U.S.- Salmon from  Norway1 43,  the  Panel found  U.S.  antidumping  actions
inconsistent  with  the  Tokyo  Code  as  regards:  "the  calculation  of  the  cost  of
production  in the country  of origin"; attribution  to  one of the Norwegian  farms the
highest cost of production  figure calculated on the  basis of BIA without  considering
how  this  would  affect the  representativeness  of  the  sample;  and  absence of  proper
consideration  of differences in weight categories as a factor  "which possibly  affected"
the  comparability  between  constructed  normal  value and export prices.144 The Panel
rejected Norwegian  contentions  on all other  points.  Would  it have been appropriate
for the Panel to recommend revocation of U.S. antidumping duty for certain incorrect
aspects of methodology  followed by U.S. authorities?  Here is what the Panel says:
". . . the Panel took  into account that  the ground  upon which  it
had  found  that  the  United  States  had  imposed  anti-dumping  duties
inconsistently  with  its  obligations  under  the  Agreement  pertained
specifically to certain aspects of the methodology  for calculating margins
of dumping.  It could not be presumed that a methodology  of calculating
dumping  margins consistent with  the Panel's  findings  on these aspects
would  necessarily result  in  a  determination  that  no  dumping  existed
rather  than  in  a  determination  that  duties  were  to  be  imposed  at  a
different  rate.  The Panel therefore  found that  in this  situation  it could
not  recommend that the Committee  request the United  States to revoke
the ADD  order  and reimburse  any duties paid or deposited under  this
order,  as requested by Norway." 145
The Panel, therefore,  recommended to the Antidumping  Committee  to request
that the U.S. bring its measures into conformity  with  its obligations under the Tokyo
Code,  and that, to  this end, the U.S. reconsider the affirmative final determination  of
dumping,  consistent with  the Panel's  findings and take such measures with  respect to
its ADD  order, as may be warranted in the light of that reconsideration. 146
In Korea-Polyacetil Raisins from the United  States,1 47 U.S. itself had requested
the  Panel  to  recommend  that  the  Committee  on  Anti-Dumping  Practices  request
Korea  "to  bring  its  law  as applied  into  conformity  with  its  obligations  under  the
Agreement"  and no revocation of the duty was expressly sought.  Due to the vagueness
of U.S.  request,  the  Panel  ruled  that  Korea  "bring  its  measure  (the  imposition  of
antidumping  duties . ..  into conformity  with its obligations under the Agreement)" 148
143  GATT  ADP/87,  30 November  1992.
144  Id. at217.
45Id.  at 218.
146  Id
141  Pescatore,  Pierre,  William  J.  Davey  and  Andreas  F.  Lowenfeld,  Handbook  of  GATr  Dispute
Settlement,  693  (Deventer,  1994).
14S  Id. at 73  1.- 36 -
There was nothing to prevent the U.S.,  if it so desired,  to request the revocation
of the duty.  It will also be noted that in both cases  the Panels left the door open for
revocation of the duty.  Be this as it may, it must be pointed out that although the
dispute settlement  mechanism agreed at  the  Uruguay Round  is  a  considerable
improvement over that of GATT 1947, so long as the national authorities do their
homework objectively  and correctly, it is not very likely that their decisions  would be
upturned.  Thus, the URAA provides:
"(i)  in  its  assessment of  the  facts of  the  matter, the  panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment  of the facts  was proper
and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.
If the  establishment of the  facts was proper  and the  evaluation was
unbiased and objective, even though the  panel might have reached a
different conclusion,  the evaluation  shall  not be overturned;
(ii)  the panel shall  interpret the relevant provisions  of the Agreement
in  accordance with  customary  rules  of  interpretation  of  public
international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the
Agreement admits of more than  one  permissible interpretation, the
panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the
Agreement  if it rests upon one of those permissible  interpretations."' 49
VIII.  CONCLUSION
The alarming increase in the number of antidumping actions pursued by the
developed  and  developing  countries  has  caused  considerable  concern  among
economists and trade  reformers.  These concerns have led to  the  suggestions of
substituting antitrust principles for antidumping laws and regulations or for using
safeguard  measures  under Article XIX of GATT 1994  and the URSA. At the current
stage of the development of international trade law neither proposal appears feasible.
Moreover, antidumping actions have become a  fact of  life and the  international
community recognizes  such actions as the only legitimate  tool to combat dumping as
defined by  and determined in accordance with  law.  Despite the urgings in  some
quarters neither municipal legal systems nor international agreements  have mandated
an "economy-wide"  cost-benefit  analysis of proposed antidumping actions.  Due to
political, technical  and other implications,  the acceptance  of such a methodology in the
near future is unlikely. The URAA has enhanced  the discipline  and made a number of
improvements,  although it cannot claim  to have  plugged  all loopholes  for the misuse of
antidumping.  In those matters where URAA is silent, ambiguous or provides room
for  flexibility in  adopting a  rule,  national authorities should  adopt  a  less trade
restrictive  rule or practice. A case  in point is the U.S. practice relating  to voting in the
149  Article  17.6.- 37 -
ITC.  A 3-3 vote in AD  and CVD  investigations constitutes an affirmative decision.1 50
It will be preferable to  require  a clear majority rather  than to treat  an evenly divided
vote as sufficient to establish a finding of injury.
The  URAA  in  conjunction  with  the  Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism  of  the
WTO  is expected to further curb the proliferation  and misuse of antidumping.  Thus, a
U.S. business executive, Intel's Maibach, is quoted as observing:
"Almost  every step of the  procedure  is going to  be more difficult for
United States petitioners...
Higher  requirements  for information  will make it more difficult to  file
complaints...  Proving  injury  will  be  harder  because  of  changes  in
standards  that  relate  to  proof  of  injury...  Proving  the  actual size  of
dumping margins will also be more difficult because of technical changes
affecting how profits are calculated and other factors... Cases will also be
likely to  end up before a World Trade  Organization  panel, which  may
have judges  that  are  less sympathetic,  and  possibly  less objective,  in
interpreting  dumping laws..."  15
15  19  U.S.C. 1677  (I1).
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